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 Legal Reforms and Their
Limitations 7 
The Law as a Means of Improvement 
The law has an important function as a moral teacher, both for the
professions and for the general public. Even though they do not always
give full effect to the value of self-determination, legal rules and court 
decisions remind society of its commitment to this value.1 Beyond this 
symbolic function, law establishes minimum, enforceable standards for
disclosure that enable injured patients to receive compensation for
injuries caused by health professionals’ failure to meet these standards.
Although the existence of this potential liability has generated anxiety
among practitioners, it has also spurred valuable reassessment of ethical
norms and professional practices and has made practitioners more 
sensitive to patients’ needs and expectations.2 The Commission firmly 
believes that the law can and should continue to perform these essential
functions. 
The Commission appreciates the practical difficulties of adopting
its approach to patient-professional relationships as 
1 See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale?: Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L.
REV. 137 (1977); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on
Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84
YALE L.J. 693 (1975). 
2 From the Commission’s survey it is apparent that several aspects of the legal
doctrine of informed consent and its implementation (i.e., increased disclosure,
increased patient involvement in decisionmaking, and consent forms) have made
physicians more sensitive to patients’ needs and expectations. As discussed in
Chapter Four, these aspects are generally viewed as beneficial to the doctor-
patient relationship because they tend to provoke discussion, enhance
understanding on the part of both doctor and patient, lead to better decisions, and
aid compliance. 
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the normative legal expectation for informed consent. Transcending
these practical difficulties is a more fundamental issue: the Commission
is not convinced that its vision of the patient-professional relationship
can be achieved primarily through reliance on the law.3 Having analyzed
the relationship in a way that recognizes the complexities and variations
of individual cases, the Commission is aware that the informed consent
process may not be susceptible to detailed regulation by so blunt an
instrument as the law of battery or of medical negligence. Indeed, the
Commission is concerned that efforts to draw the law further into
regulating the subtler aspects of relationships between patients and health
care professionals may prove ineffective, burdensome, and ultimately
counterproductive.4
3 One obstacle to the implementation of the Commission’s vision through law is 
the difficulty of formulating an appropriate means of enforcement. When a health 
care professional does not engage in ethically proper discussion with a patient, 
and the failure to do so causes no bodily harm to the patient, the amount of 
damages to which the patient would be entitled are nominal, and thus few if any 
patients (and lawyers) would be willing to bring suit under such circumstances. 
Instead of relying on traditional litigation to implement the Commission’s vision, 
[t]his could be achieved by establishing a system of non-insurable tort-
fines for violation of the duty to disclose and a compensation fund. The 
fines would be paid into the fund, which would be used to compensate 
those persons the legislature defines as injured by nondisclosure. Under 
this arrangement doctors are provided with guidance and are subject to 
specific deterrence. All physicians who violate a duty to disclose would 
be liable for fines that could be set in accordance with their deterrence 
objective. Only those patients suffering injury, as defined by the 
legislature, would be compensated. 
Leonard L. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 
580, 606-07. 
4 One unfortunate by-product of the legal regulation, through malpractice suits, of 
the doctor-patient relationship in an attempt to establish a minimum level of 
quality in the provision of medical services is practice of what is referred to as 
“defensive” medicine, which “consist[s] of medically unjustified care provided 
by the physician for the purpose of reducing the possibility of a malpractice 
suit….” Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive 
Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 942. This study concludes that “[t]he threat of a 
malpractice suit does induce physicians to overutilize diagnostic tests and 
procedures in particular cases, but…the practice is not extensive and probably not 
a contributing factor to the rising costs of medical care.” Id. at 964. But see Elliot 
Sagall, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right?, 10 TRIAL (July/Aug. 
1974) at 59, 60, suggesting that reports on the extent of the practice of defensive 
medicine are exaggerated. 
  Legal Reforms and Limitations  153 
Nevertheless, in this Report the Commission has set forth a vision
of informed consent that could, if incorporated into state law as cases
arise, bring the law closer to its ethical roots as well as to the realities
and potentialities of day-to-day health care. Although the Commission
does not regard changes in the law as the major way its conclusions
about informed consent will be translated into practice, it does believe
that it would be appropriate—even desirable—for the law on the subject
to adjust its minimum expectations in the direction pointed to in this
Report. 
Most fundamentally, the law could emphasize the process of
continuing communication and decisionmaking, rather than the pro
forma disclosure of particular risks that now strikes many practitioners
as a hollow charade.5 Such a shift in focus would make clear that a
professional’s obligation is not satisfied—and the professional is not
insulated from legal liability—simply by obtaining the patient’s
signature on a consent form.6 Instead, courts could engage in a more
qualitative evaluation of the entire process that would account for the
professional’s overall effort to elicit matters of particular concern to the
patient and to respond to the patient’s worries, insofar as reasonably
possible, through disclosure and discussion. Instead of focusing, as is
now the case, on whether the 
In Texas, informed consent is legally governed by a set of detailed 
regulations describing what doctors are supposed to disclose for particular 
procedures. See 3 Tex. Reg. 4293-96. §§ 319.01.03.001.-.003 (Dec. 12, 1978), 
issued pursuant to Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 6.03 (Vernon Cum. 
Supp. 1980). The limitations of law in regulation of the relationship between 
doctors and patients is well developed by Fox and Swazey in their discussion of 
the famous heart transplant case of Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 
1974). See Renée C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A 
SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS, Univ. of 
Chicago Press, Chicago (1974) at 201 et seq. 
5 The requirement of informed consent has frequently been described by 
physicians as a myth or a fiction. See, e.g., Henry K. Beecher, Consent in 
Clinical Experimentation—Myth and Reality, 195 J.A.M.A. 34-35 (1966); 
Preston J. Burnham, Medical Experimentation on Humans, 152 SCIENCE 448 
(1966); William P. Irvin, “Now, Mrs. Blare, About the Complications…,” 40 
MED. ECON. 102 (1963); Eugene G. Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 
235 J.A.M.A. 1579 (1976); Edmund B. Middleton, Informed Consent, 233 
J.A.M.A. 1049 (1975); Mark Ravitch, Informed Consent—Descent to Absurdity, 
101 MED. TIMES No. 9, 164 (1973). The articles critical of informed consent 
appear to have diminished in frequency in the last few years. 
6 See note 44, Chapter One supra. If informed consent is viewed as a process—
as this Report envisions—rather than as an event, proposals to embody 
“informed consent” in a written or “electronic” document are ultimately 
unavailing. See, e.g., Note, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 241, 273-81 (1978). 
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practitioner warned the patient of risks, courts would inquire into 
whether or not the practitioner took sufficient steps to involve the patient 
in the decisionmaking process. The questions before the court could 
include, for example, whether the practitioner made reasonable efforts to 
impart information, to determine whether the patient understood it, to 
elicit the patient’s values and preferences, to create a noncoercive 
atmosphere for the decision, and to encourage the patient to decide on 
the basis of the available information and the patient’s own values.7
Efforts to translate the Commission’s recommendations of ethical 
norms for the communication process directly into detailed legal rules 
may create evidentiary difficulties. To the extent that the issues to be 
examined in a lawsuit would be more subtle and subjective than they 
currently are if the Commission’s recommendations were to form the 
ethical basis of law, proof of what occurred would be complicated. Of 
course, the direct testimony of both professional and patient could 
provide accounts of the decisionmaking process. Yet as discussed in 
Chapter One, the tendency of such testimony to be selective and self-
serving is familiar and difficult to overcome.8 Documentary evidence 
could be introduced as well, but the production of a full documentary 
record reflecting not merely a formal written consent but the entire 
process of communication and decisionmaking over an extended time 
would impose substantial burdens. Of particular concern would be the 
time needed to generate and ensure the accuracy of such records from the 
viewpoints of all parties. 
The implication to be drawn from these difficulties is not, however, 
that professionals should comply with the limited requirements of the 
law, and then go about their business as they see fit. The Commission 
rejects the attitude that divides obligations into two categories: those that 
are legally established and must be obeyed under pain of penalty, and 
those that are not so established and hence can be ignored. Throughout 
this Report the Commission has employed the 
7 Several current dilemmas in informed consent law would remain problematic in 
this view. For example, what causal relationship needs to be established between 
the professional’s failure to provide a basis for effective participation and the 
physical injury associated with treatment? When the professional’s failure to 
provide such a basis did not result in physical injury to the patient, there would be 
no readily ascertainable monetary damages to serve as a basis for redress (or to 
encourage an attorney to take the case on a contingent-fee basis). A standard for 
money damages to redress dignitary injuries may be needed, or the governmental 
and voluntary organizations that regulate licensure and certification may need to 
investigate allegations of systematic violation of patients’ rights, as a ground for 
professional discipline. 
8 See pp. 25-26 supra. 
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terminology of “professional-patient relationships” rather than the 
language of the marketplace, which treats patients as “consumers,” to 
underline the importance of recapturing a sense of professional norms
and obligations. Such norms are more than gratuitous advice; they are to
be taken seriously, both by individual professionals and by their
organizations.9
In distinguishing between a strictly legal obligation to secure 
consent and a professional’s broader obligation to provide patients with a
basis for effective participation in decisionmaking, the Commission
hopes to remind health care professionals that their obligations transcend
legal requirements and incorporate objectives that the law cannot readily
enforce. The roots of the broader obligation are ethical and reside with
the mutual trust and expectations that are appropriate for parties to the
relationship. The Commission believes that recognition and fulfillment 
of these professional obligations by health care practitioners will go a
long way toward alleviating the sometimes adversary character that has
encroached upon patient-professional relationships in recent years and 
will reinforce the mutual trust on which successful relationships are
ultimately founded. 
 
Enhancing Self-Determination of the Formerly 
Competent 
In addition to any judicial modification in the law of consent to
bring it into line with the Commission’s conclusions, states should direct 
legislative attention to giving patients the means to have at least some
say about treatment decisions in the event they become incapable of
participating in decisions directly.10 More than one-third of the public in 
the Commission’s survey have given instructions (though only one-
quarter of those are in writing) to someone about how they would like to
be treated if they become too sick to make decisions themselves. While
this issue has gained prominence largely because of the attention 
recently accorded to so-called living wills for dying patients, people can 
and do set forth instructions to guide a wide variety of health care
decisions. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, such means would permit two of the
goals of self-determination to be fulfilled: individualizing the meaning of 
well-being and showing respect for personal dignity. The third goal—
that a patient be an active 
9 Indeed, although the broad generalities of battery and malpractice law, which 
aim largely at redressing past misconduct, may not be helpful here, the rules 
spelled out by hospital boards, medical societies, and licensing bodies could 
provide more detailed prospective guidance and encouragement. 
10 Standards and procedures for assessing which patients are incapable of 
participating in a health care decision are discussed in Chapter Eight infra. 
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agent in decisions about his or her own care—would be impossible to 
achieve at all in the case of an unconscious patient and impossible to 
achieve fully with patients who are less seriously incapacitated.
Although this Report focuses on patients’ direct decisions about their
own care, no discussion of legal reforms would be complete without
some attention to how a person’s informed consent might carry forward 
to a time when he or she is no longer able to participate directly through
the use of written directions (known as “advance directives”) prepared in
anticipation of some future incapacitating illness. 
Without changes in the law, the problem facing a person who wants 
to direct the care he or she will receive if incompetent is that the
authorization provided to a family member or physician ceases to be
legally effective at just the time when it is needed, namely when the
person becomes incompetent, because of the legal rule (which is quite
sensible in other contexts) that an agent’s authority is terminated by
incompetence of the person who appointed that agent.11 Thus, special 
provision must be made if a person’s directions about medical care, set 
down while he or she is competent, are to be effective in determining, or
even officially guiding, the decisions actually made if the person
becomes incompetent. 
Instruction Directives. Two types of advance directives have 
already been recognized by some states: instruction directives and proxy 
decisionmaking directives. The best known examples of the first type are
the “natural death” statutes that have been enacted in 14 states since the
first was adopted in 1976 in California.12 These specify certain circum-
stances under which a directive to a treating physician (the wording of
which is usually set forth in the statute) will be effective in limiting the
extent of life-sustaining treatment administered to a patient whose
condition has been diagnosed as imminently fatal. Instruction directives 
are, in theory, limited neither to terminal illness nor to orders to desist
from treatment. They could be employed by patients who have been told
that they may soon become incapable of making decisions (for example, 
because of a brain tumor) or by those who simply 
11 See American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minn. (1957) at § 122. 
12 See Ala. Code §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (Supp. 1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-
3801-.3804 (Supp. 1981); Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (Deering 
Supp. 1982); D.C. Code §§ 6-2421 to 2430 (Supp. 1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, 
§§ 2501-2509 (1982); Idaho Code §§ 39-4501 to 4508 (Supp. 1982); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 65-28,101 to 65-28,109 (Supp. 1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 449.540-.690 
(1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-11 (1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-320 
to 90-322 (1981); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 97.050-.090 (1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann. art. 4590h §§ 1-11 (Vernon 1982); 18 Vt. Stat. Ann. §§ 5251-5262 (1982); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 70.122.010-70.122.905 (West 1982). 
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wish to have “standing orders” about some aspect of their care (such as 
no blood transfusions). Instructions could authorize the use of certain 
types of treatments, as in the case of people diagnosed as having 
progressive senile dementia of the Alzheimer’s type who, before they 
become incompetent, give their permission for research procedures of 
more than minimal risk. And rather than specifying that under particular 
circumstances an individual does or does not authorize a particular type 
of medical intervention, instructions could describe a person’s attitude 
toward a particular state of affairs.13
Whether the instructions are quite precise or very general, for 
several reasons an advance directive of this type is of limited use in 
providing effective self-determination. First, it would be extremely 
difficult to draft a directive that did not leave considerable range for 
interpretation; both the existence of the circumstances making the 
directive effective and the steps to be taken under it will often require 
discretion by health care professionals and family. Second, if the terms of 
the document were made more precise in order to leave the choices more 
with the patient and less with the treating professionals, the range of 
circumstances to which the document would apply would have to be 
narrowed or its length and complexity would have to be increased. 
13 An example of such a directive would be one stating: “I feel that I would rather 
not live than remain in an unconscious state from which I have no likelihood of 
recovering.” This might provide a clearer sense of a person’s feelings and wishes 
than a directive that merely specifies the treatment a person does or does not want 
under certain circumstances. 
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Third, and perhaps most important in light of the analysis of 
informed consent contained in this Report, instruction directives are 
likely to address only a limited range of medical situations that occur 
frequently enough to be of general concern to people. Beyond these, a 
directive would itself be an example of knowing and voluntary self-
determination only if it emerged from a patient-professional relationship 
in which the patient had been counseled about the future risk of a 
particular disability and about the courses of treatment that would 
probably then be available. Even then, decisionmaking under an 
instruction has a truncated quality since the patient will have dictated 
specific decisions before all the particulars of the situation were clear and 
before the process of mutual participation and shared decisionmaking 
had fully ripened. Consequently, such directives are likely to be more 
useful in excluding certain procedures that are totally unacceptable to a 
patient than in fine-tuning decisionmaking about a full range of possible 
health care choices. 
Proxy Directives.14 An alternative type of directive, which would 
avoid the difficulties both of anticipating all possible treatment choices 
and of leaving full discretion to health care professionals, would 
designate a person as authorized to make treatment decisions on a 
patient’s behalf under specified circumstances.15 Both the range of 
circumstances in which the proxy may act and the range of choices he or 
she is authorized to make could be broad or narrow. For example, a 
person who wanted vigorous treatment could authorize a proxy to make 
all necessary decisions, subject only to the requirement that all therapies 
be aggressively pursued if they offered any possibility of benefit. 
Although a proxy’s decisions are not directly acts of the patient, 
proxy directives meet the objective of allowing patients to limit what 
happens to them if they appoint proxies with whom they have discussed 
their views and who are willing to insist on treatment decisions that are 
consistent with those views. The proxy can participate in the process of 
shared decisionmaking in the patient’s stead, so that that process is 
14 The term “surrogate” is used in this report (see Chapter Eight infra) to
designate an agent authorized to make a health care decision on behalf of a
patient who lacks the capacity to do so personally. Within this category, a
“proxy” is a surrogate appointed by a patient. 
15 In the context of the present discussion, the triggering event under a directive
designating a proxy would be (at the least) that the signer had become incapable
of participating in decisions about his or her own care. Directives could, in
theory, designate a proxy to step into the decisionmaking shoes of a person who
remained capable of making his or her own choices but who chose not to. 
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not artificially truncated. The degree to which this proxy process actually 
substitutes for a patient’s direct participation depends upon how 
extensively the patient had previously talked over the relevant issues with 
health professionals. 
By combining a proxy directive with specific instructions, an 
individual could control both the content and the process of 
decisionmaking about care in case of incapacity. The use of instructions 
would help overcome the open-ended nature of designating a proxy by 
increasing the likelihood that in the process of deciding on instructions a 
person would have discussed relevant considerations with both the 
potential proxy and the health care professionals—in other words, that 
the person would go through a process of prospective informed consent. 
The possibility of appointing a proxy for health care 
decisionmaking already exists in the laws of 37 states that have adopted 
statutes authorizing what is usually termed a durable power of attorney.16 
Although these were fashioned over the past 30 years primarily to 
provide a less expensive means than court-ordered guardianship or 
conservatorship for dealing with small property interests, there is nothing 
in the acts that would explicitly preclude the use of durable powers of 
attorney to designate or instruct a proxy to make health care decisions. 
Commentators have suggested such use and there is 
16 See Alaska Stat. §§ 13.26.325, .330 (1979); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 14-5501 to 
5502 (1975); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-501 to 511 (1971); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-14-
501 to 502 (Supp. 1979); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-690 (1979); Del. Code tit. 25, §§ 
175-180 (Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 709.08 (West 1980); Ga. Code Ann. § 4-
214.1 (1975); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 560:5-501 to 502 (Supp. 1979); Idaho Code §§ 
15-5-501 to 502 (1979); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 30-2-1.5-1 to 2 (Burns Supp. 1979-
1981); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 633.705-.706 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 386.093 (Supp. 1978); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-501 to 502 (1979); Md. 
Est. & Trusts Code Ann. §§ 13-601 to 602 (1974); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 201, § 
50 (Michie Supp. 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 700.495-.499 (Supp. 1980-
1981); Minn. Stat. Ann §§ 524.5-501 to 502 (West 1975); Miss. Code Ann. § 87-
3-15 (1973); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-5-501 to 502 (1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-
2662 to 2663 (1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:2B-8 to 9 (West Supp. 1979-1980); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-5-501 to 502 (1978); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1601 
(McKinney 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-115.1 (1976 & Supp. 1979); N.D. Cent. 
Code §§ 30.1-30-01 to 02 (1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1337.09-.091 (Page 
1979); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, §§ 1051-1062 (West Supp. 1979-1980); Or. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 126.407, .413 (1979); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 5601-5602 (Purdon 1975); 
S.C. Code § 32-13-10 (Supp. 1979); Tex. Prob. Code Ann. tit. 17A, § 36A 
(Vernon Supp. 1980); Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-501 to 502 (1978); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 14, §§ 3-51-3052 (Supp. 1979); Va. Code §§ 11-9.1 to .2 (1978); Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. §§ 11.94.010-.020 (Supp. 1980-1981); Wyo. Stat. §§ 34-9-101 to 110 
(1977). See also Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, 8 U.L.A. 74-80 
(1981). 
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anecdotal evidence that it has occurred, but this use has not been the
subject of any reported judicial decisions.17
Statutory Developments. In addition to the existing statutes that 
provide a means for patients to create one type of advance directive or
another, several model statutes have been proposed specifically to allow
such directives in health care.18 In evaluating existing or proposed means 
or in devising new ones, several factors need to be taken into account.
Four groupings of such considerations are presented here to suggest the
range of issues the Commission believes should be addressed in
evaluating statutory alternatives. 
Requisites for a valid directive. Special attention needs to be given 
to the basic requisites for a valid directive, particularly since some of the
statutes that might be employed—such as the durable power of attorney 
acts—were not designed specifically for the appointment of proxy health 
care decisionmakers. 
Decisionmaking capacity of principal: There should be some way to 
establish that a person filling out a directive (the principal) was legally
competent to do so at the time. The emphasis of this Report (as discussed 
in Chapters Three and Eight) is on patients possessing decisional
capacity rather than on legal competence. Should a statute insist that
when a directive is executed the person has the capacity to understand the
choice embodied in the directive? To certify a signatory’s capacity, 
statutes often require one or two witnesses to a document. It would seem
advisable for a statute to be clear on whether the witnesses must attest to
the principal’s capacity or merely serve as safeguards against fraudulent
signatures. Since such witnesses are likely to be laypeople, the standard
of decisionmaking capacity they apply will rest on common sense, not
psychological expertise. 
Due regard for the step being taken: The related concern that 
everyone involved in the execution of a directive, particularly the 
principal and the prospective proxy, recognize the seriousness of the step
is something that would be more difficult to guarantee by statute. It is,
however, a consideration that arises in evaluating the wisdom of using 
existing durable-power statutes, which were intended to address only
property matters. One way to increase the likelihood that due regard is
given to the subject matter would be to provide that before a 
17 Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm—The Durable Power of Attorney—
Planned Protective Services and the Living Will, 13 REAL PROPERTY, 
PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 1, 2-4, 35-36, 41 (Spring 1978). 
18 Yale Law School Legislative Services Project, MEDICAL TREATMENT
DECISION ACT, Society for the Right to Die, New York (1981) at § 3; 
UNIFORM HEALTH CARE CONSENT ACT, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, New York (1982) at § 6; UNIFORM
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT ACT, Concern for Dying, Chicago (Draft,
May 1982) at §§ 3-5. 
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directive is executed, the principal (and proxy, where one is involved)
must have had a discussion with a health care professional of the
patient’s objectives and of the directive’s potential consequences. This
would also help ensure that any instructions reflect a process of active
self-determination on the part of the patient-to-be. 
Legal effect of directives. Several questions arise about the effects
that a directive should have in the law and about how these effects might
be achieved. 
Registration: Certain documents are officially registered, so that
they will not be ignored and so there can be no doubt that all concerned
parties are aware of their existence. The process of registration also
provides an opportunity to ensure that all the basic documentary
requisites have been met; for example, an official who is charged with
registering directives could be trained to determine the competence of
signers. On the other hand, the additional formality of required
registration might seriously discourage the use of directives, and it is
doubtful whether in this context—unlike in a commercial or real estate
setting—there is really much need for a directive to be on file in a
governmental office in order for it to have its desired effect at the time it
would be needed. 
Legal immunity: A statute should make clear that people acting
pursuant to a directive are not subject to civil or criminal liability for any
action they take that they would not be liable for were they acting on the
direct consent of a competent patient. Yet since directives—particularly
those including instructions—may contain unavoidable ambiguities,
some leeway must be offered if this legal immunization is to provide
adequate reassurance for health care professionals. Some of the existing
statutes speak of protection for actions taken in “good faith.”19 Language
of this sort provides sensible protection for subsidiary health personnel
who follow the orders of the physician in charge of the patient, provided
they believe the physician’s orders are in line with the directive or have
been authorized by a proxy. Some standard of reasonable interpretation
of the directive may need to be imposed, however, on an attending
physician’s reading of the document, lest “good faith” offer too wide a
scope for discretion. Such a standard might best be developed in case
law and scholarly commentary rather than in the statute itself. 
Penalties for noncompliance: In order to make directives legally
binding, several states have included penalties in their 
19 See Ala. Code § 22-8A-7 (Supp. 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 § 2505 (1982); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28,106 (Supp. 1981); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-7 (1981); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 97.065 (1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.050 (West 1982). 
See also MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION ACT, supra note 18, at § 9; 
UNIFORM RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT ACT, supra note 18, at § 12. 
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statutes (fines, for example, or suspension or revocation of professional 
licenses) for failing to follow an advance directive.20 The wisdom or 
necessity of such penalty clauses depends upon the problem a statute is 
attempting to remedy. If health care providers are unwilling to share 
responsibility with patients and, in particular, tend to overtreat patients 
whose physical or mental condition leaves them unable to resist, then—
unless they are made legally binding—advance directives are unlikely to 
protect effectively patients who want to limit their treatment. On the 
other hand, if health care professionals are simply unsure of what patients 
want, or if they are anxious to share decisionmaking responsibility but 
are apprehensive about their legal liability if they follow the instructions 
of a person whose decisionmaking capacity is in doubt, then the threat of 
penalties would be unnecessary. Indeed, it could even be 
counterproductive if it fostered an adversarial relationship between 
patient and provider. 
Proxy’s characteristics and authority. Several special questions 
arise in the context of health care concerning who may act as a proxy and 
what the proxy may do. 
Competency of the proxy: The basic consideration about a proxy is 
that he or she should have the capacity to make a particular health care 
decision when needed. The means for assuring this capacity are not so 
simply stated, however. Basically, they would seem to be the same ones 
that are applied to patients themselves, as discussed in Chapter Eight.21
Disqualifications: Another issue, which could also be treated as a 
prerequisite for appointing a proxy, concerns whether limitations should 
be placed on who may serve. The main consideration is to avoid the 
appointment of anyone with interests that are adverse to a patient’s. In 
some “natural death” statutes, this has led to explicit exclusion of anyone 
financially involved (as debtor, creditor, or heir) with the patient.22 
Special concern may also be warranted for patients in nursing homes.23 
Unfortunately, in the absence of a special 
20 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7191(b) (Deering Supp. 1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 65-28, 107(a) (Supp. 1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h § 7(b) 
(Vernon 1982). See also MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION ACT, supra note 
18, at § 9; UNIFORM RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT ACT, supra note 18, 
at § 12. 
21 See pp. 172-73 infra. 
22 See Ala. Code § 22-8A-4 (Supp. 1981); Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7188 
(Deering Supp. 1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2503(b) (1982); Idaho Code § 
39-4505 (Supp. 1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28,103(a) (Supp. 1981); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 449.600 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-321(c) (1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
97.055 (1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h § 3 (Vernon 1982); 18 Vt. 
Stat. Ann. § 5254 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.030 (West 1982). 
23 See, e.g., Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7188.5 (Deering Supp. 1982): “A 
directive shall have no force or effect if the declarant is a patient in 
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group of people who serve as proxies for patients there, the people most 
readily available—the nursing staff and institutional officers—are  
typically not disinterested. 
Redelegation: In certain circumstances a proxy may be temporarily 
or permanently unable or unwilling to serve as a substitute 
decisionmaker. When that occurs, should alternate proxies be limited to 
people who were named by the principal in an original or amended 
directive, or, in the absence of such alternates, should a proxy be allowed 
to delegate his or her authority to another person of the proxy’s 
choosing?24 This issue might be affected by whether either the original or 
a substitute proxy was a close relative of the patient, as opposed to a 
stranger. 
Access to information: Since the proxy stands in the shoes of the 
patient and is expected to engage in a comparable decisionmaking 
process, logically the proxy should have access to the patient’s medical 
record. Yet it may be advisable to limit the proxy’s access only to that 
information needed for the health care decision at hand, in order to 
respect the patient’s interest in privacy. 
Bases of decision: In the case of a proxy directive, a proxy would be 
expected to decide about health care in a way calculated to serve the 
patient’s best interests. Although that concept is an elastic one, the law of 
each state gives it some meaning, and it has received extensive attention 
in legal and philosophical commentary.25 Ought the concept of best inter- 
a skilled nursing facility...at the time the directive is executed unless one of the 
two witnesses to the directive is a patient advocate or ombudsman as may be 
designated by the State Department of Aging for this purpose….” The 
explanation given by the legislature for enacting this provision is that some 
patients in skilled nursing facilities may be so insulated from a voluntary 
decisionmaking role, by virtue of the custodial nature of their care, as to require 
special assurance that they are capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a 
directive.” 
24 The UNIFORM HEALTH CARE CONSENT ACT addresses this issue in 
several sections. Section 5 provides for a limited delegation of power by some 
individuals authorized to consent to health care for another under § 4(a)(2), 
(b)(2), and (b)(3). According to § 5, the only individuals authorized to consent for 
another who may delegate their decisional authority are family members. 
Nonfamily health care representatives, who may be appointed according to the 
terms of § 6, are not authorized to delegate their decisional authority. All 
delegations must be in writing, and unless the writing so specifies, no further 
delegation of decisional authority is permitted. Any delegated authority termi-
nates six months after the effective date of the writing. 
25 See Joel Feinberg, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY, 
Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J. (1980); Ruth Macklin, Return to the Best 
Interests of the Child, in Willard Gaylin and Ruth Macklin, eds., WHO SPEAKS 
FOR THE CHILD, Plenum Press, New York (1982); A. M. Capron, The 
Authority of Others to Decide About Biomedical 
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ests be uniform, or should it vary, within certain outer limits, if the
surrogate is the next-of-kin rather than a stranger? An instruction 
directive, whether by itself or joined with a proxy directive, creates the
potential for decisions based upon the particular (and perhaps 
idiosyncratic) wishes of the patient. The interpretation of such a directive
would seem to lie with the surrogate decisionmaker, particularly in the
case of a proxy designated by the patient, at least in the first instance.
Provision may have to be made, of course, for an administrative 
mechanism to decide situations in which a health care professional
challenges the decision of a proxy on the ground that it is not based on
the patient’s best interests or on a reasonable interpretation of the
patient’s instructions. 
Administrative aspects. Several procedural concerns probably need 
to be addressed in any statute for advanced health care directives. 
Triggering event: A statute needs to specify how a directive 
becomes effective. Two sets of concerns are involved. The first, already 
mentioned, relates to the necessary guarantee that the directive reflects
the wishes of the patient. Some of the “natural death” acts, for example,
require that a directive must be executed after the patient has been
informed of a diagnosis, so that the patient’s instructions are arrived at in
the context of the actual, not hypothetical, choices to be made.26 Statutes 
also typically provide that the designation of a surrogate or the content of
specific instructions be renewed every few years so that the signatory can 
reconsider the instructions or designation in light of changed
circumstances or opinions.27 Once it is determined that a directive is 
valid, a separate issue needs to be addressed: what makes it operative? A
statute may leave that question to the document itself, to be specified by
the person executing the directive. Or it may provide that a particular
event or condition brings the document into play. In either case, the
triggering event will require both a standard for action and a 
specification of who will make the determination. For example, a
directive may become operative when a physician makes a particular
prognosis (“terminal illness”) or determines that a patient lacks
decisional capacity regarding a particular health care choice. 
Intervention with Incompetents, in Gaylin and Macklin, id.; Joseph Goldstein, 
Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD, Free Press, New York (1979). 
26 See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7188 (Deering Supp. 1982); Idaho Code § 
39-4504 (Supp. 1982); Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.055 (1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
art. 4590h § 3 (Vernon 1982). 
27 See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7188 (Deering Supp. 1982); Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 16, § 2506(c) (1982); Idaho Code § 39-4504 (Supp. 1982); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
97.055 (1981). 
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Revocation: Provision must be made for the process and standard
by which a document can be revoked. The theory of self-determination 
suggests that as long as the principal remains competent, he or she 
should unquestionably have the power to revoke a directive. But what
about an incompetent (incapacitated) person? The “natural death” acts
have uniformly provided that any revocation by a principal negates a 
directive.28 In the context of termination of life-sustaining treatment, that 
result may be sensible, since it would generally seem wrong to cease
such treatment based upon a proxy’s orders when a patient, no matter
how confused, asks that treatment be continued. In other circumstances, 
however, allowing revocations by an incompetent patient could wreak
havoc on a course of treatment authorized by the proxy. Perhaps when a
proxy does not believe he or she should be guided by a principal’s
contemporaneous instructions, on the grounds that the principal is 
incompetent and is contradicting earlier competent instructions and/or
acting against the principal’s own best interests, the question of whether
to follow the proxy or the principal ought to be subject to independent
review. 
Review and safeguards: When disputes arise, either about the 
choice made by a proxy or about an attempted revocation by an
apparently incapacitated principal, some means of review will be
necessary to safeguard the patient’s interests. In some circumstances the 
review mechanism need only judge the process by which a decision has
been reached. In other circumstances it may seem advisable to review the
health care decision itself, which in turn may involve either a subjective
or an objective approach to the patient’s well-being. In the absence of a 
special provision in the statute, questions of this sort would lead to
review by institutional bodies and, eventually, to judicial proceedings. 
In sum, serious issues need to be addressed, either in the
applicability to health care of existing statutes created to resolve other
problems, such as the durable power of attorney acts, or in the drafting or
revision of statutes specifically to permit advance directives for health
care. Many people are concerned that, as they become old or ill or 
especially if they are hospitalized, decisions about their health care will
pass out of their hands and into those of health care professionals, who
may be strangers to them. This widespread concern justifies 
28 See Ala. Code § 22-8A-5 (Supp. 1981); Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7189 
(Deering Supp. 1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2504 (1982); Idaho Code § 39-
4505 (Supp. 1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28,104 (Supp. 1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
449.620 (1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-6 (1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-321(e) 
(1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.055 (1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590h § 
4(a) (Vernon 1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.040 (West 1982). 
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continued attempts to find a simple way to extend at least basic self-
determination into a period of decisional incapacity. Although the issue 
has received particular public attention in the context of terminal 
illness,29 it is not limited to that setting, and there are good reasons to 
treat the entire subject of advance directives within a single statute. 
Without endorsing any particular statute, the Commission does endorse 
the development of advance directives and encourages patients and 
professionals to use them as appropriate whether or not there is a specific 
statute that regulates and enforces their use. 
29 Indeed, the subject receives further attention from the Commission in its 
forthcoming report on deciding about life-sustaining therapy. 
